INTRODUCTION
Over more than a decade, government, industry, and academic centers have invested substantial resources in techniques for developing secure computer systems. A good deal has been learned about the problem, and a number of aljproaches have been explored. But what useful advice can we give to those about to embark on a system development? If the application requires a multilevel secure system, how should the developer proceed? The purpose of this report is to summarize past experience and to guide developers.
The next section lists a few general assumptions about the system developer's environment. The third section describes past, present, and planned projects that have attempted to build secure computer systems. A brief discussion of each system listed in the tables can be found in Appendix A. The fourth section summarizes the experience gained in developing secure systems by listing a number of te'zhniques and applications (alphabetically by "buzzword") and providing a brief discussion of each. The fifth section provides advice to developers, organized by the phases of the syst,-m development cycle.
There is no simple recipe for creating a multilevel secure system. The "three-laser" security kernel approach, in which application programs execute on an operating system emulator that interfaces to the security kernel, has yet to produce a system that is eflicient enough for practical use (although there is some hope that kernels tailored to specific applications may yet achieve this goal). There has been considerable work on formal specification and program verification techniques, but the tools available to support these activities require further development before they can be employed in development efforts.
To be secure, a computer system must reliably enforce a specified policy for accessing the data it processes while it accomplishes the functions for which it was built Since software engineering has as its goal the production of reliable, maintainable programs that perform according to their specifications, the best techniques developed for software engineering should be the cornerstone of efforts to develop secure computer systems.
The principal recommendations to developers are (1) that they consider the security requirements of each system as part of its functional requirements rather than as a separate set of requirements; (2) that they continue to think about security throughout the design and impleme,,tation of the system; and (3) that they use the best available softwvare engineering technology I1].
ASSUMPTIONS
We assume that the developer is to construct a system for some particular application (e.g., packet switching, message processing, software development) and that he has substantial control over the choice of hardware for the system, the choice of software design and documentation strategy, and the I choice of validation and verification strategy. He will have somewhat less control over the choice of programming language; he will have much less control over the interfaces required of his system; and he will have still less control over the set of systems with which the new system is required to interface. 
CASES OF INTERES't
We choose not to list all or the jour~nal articles, memcranda, research papers, and ~o forth, relating to computer security that have been published in the last decade or so. In any casul,' few of these have the weight of actual system developments, behind them. This section summarizeýt those projects over the last 10 to 15 years (including currently underway and plannedI projects) that have included significant efforts to provide secure software systems. Although there have been no 4ieliberate omissionis to the list, it is possible that some developments have been overlooked. The foý'1owing questions were asked about each system:
I .
When did its development begin?/ 12. Was it/is it installed? Where?
What lessons were learned?
The answers to these questions (except the last) are given in Tables 1 to 3 . The abbreviations used in these tables are listed in Table 4 . Brief comments about each project, summarizing noteworthy aspects and lessons learned, are provided in Appendix A. The reader is cautioned that some of this informakion is subject to change (particularly for projects underway or planned) and parts of it are the personal conclusions of the author of .,his report. The bibliography (Appendix B) provides additional sources of information on the projects listed in Tables I to 3, but the literature consists largely of technical reports; old reports may be hard to obtain, and reports on new projects have yet to be written.
EXPERIENCE WITH TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS
To distill the lessons from these projects, it is helpful to view them according to the various techniques they have used and the applications that have been tried. Listed alphabetically in this section are various technical concepts and application areas for developing secure systems, together with comments concerning experience with each. 
Capabilities
A capability is usually defined as an unforgeable ticket that grants its holder a specific kind of access to a particular object, capabilities can be implemented as virtual addresses, with additioval bits to define allowed access modes. Capabilities provide a mechanism for controlling access to objects, not for implementing security policy, The provision of security depends on the design of the system, which may be based on the use of capabilities. Nevertheless, they are an appealing tool for structuring the implementation if the appropriate hardware is available. Without the appropriate hardware, there is considerable evidence that capability-based systems perform poorly (but see GNOSIS). Architectures based on the manipulation of capabilities are still more touted than tried, although hardware architecture tiends seem to be movinR in this direction (e.g., the Plessey S250, the IBM System 38, and the Intel 432). The UCLA DSU kernel (and hence the SDC Communications Kernel) employs the concept of a capability but is constrained to use the addressing hardware of a PDP-I 1. PSOS is intended to employ a capability architecture and will be an interesting test case, if it is built. The GNOSIS effort claims to be based on an implementation of capabilities on standard IBM 370 hardware. No secure system developments using the Plessey hard vare have been reported.
Databases
None of the secure system development efforts so far nave tried to deal with the complexities of securing a database management system shared among a variety of users. rhere is substantial theoretical evidence that statistical databases are impossible to secure against inference, but there are some techni lues that can make it more difficult for information to be compromised.
Encryption
There are increasing efforts to apply encryption within computer systems. Protection and distribu. tion of keys then becomes a critical issue. Because they were generally trying to secure the operating system itself, which would presumably control access to keys, none of the systems listed in Tables I to  3 used encryption as a technique for protecting information.
Kernels
Many of the projects listed above sought to demonstrate the practicality of the security kernel approach. A security kernel is a small subset of a system that is responsible for its security dtd so must provide complete validation of program references, must be isolated (tamperproof), and must operate correctty according to a stated security policy. The results so far are mixed, at best. The three-layer approach (user programs running on an operating system emulator running on a security kernel) has yet to produce a system efficient enough for operational use. The KSOS represents the most serious attempt to use this approach to build an operational system, and it has fallen far short of its performance goal of approximately 50% degradation of unmodified UNIX on the same hardware, Some observers lay the blame at the feet of the PDP-I 1 hardware. Perfor.nance data are just becoming available on the kernel for the SCOMP, which is built on hardware specifically modifiti to assist security. Honeywell now plans to build a minimal operating system interface, including a simple file system, outside of the kernel, instead of developing a full emulator. The KVM/370, which is more on the order of a retrofit kernel, has been brought up on IBM and Amdahl hardware, and early indications are that it offers about 50% of the performance of unmodified VM370 on the same hardware. SHARE-7 is now described as having a security kernel, but -1 appears to have been constructed more on the virtual machine model, with kernel terminology superimposed on it after the fact. The SDC Communications Kernel, which seems to be the kernel-based system closest to delivering a useful product at present, is really a two-layer approach: the kernel is carefully tailored for the application and the application runs directly on the kernel. The AUTODIN II kernel is rarely cited as a good example of anything. Recerat reports from the Christian R6vsing company in Denmark may indicate a significant advance in the, development of an operational system based on a security kernel.
NRL REPORT 8554

Measures
There are no useful quantitative measures at present for defining the relative "security" of various systems. None of the projects listed in th-tables has addressed this problem seriously. The only realistic measures would seem to be the difficulty of penetration or the rate of unauthorized information flow out of the system under specified conditions.
Network Architectures
Although papers are being published in this area, nove! architectures for secure networks are lacking. While some of the efforts described have developed machines for use as network switches (AUTODIN II, SACDIN), none has provided innovative solutions to network security problems. Topics under study include the use of public key encryption algorithms and making communication protocols secure. End-to-end encryption does appear to be coming closer to being practical. The WWMCCS local network project may contribute so aething to the solution of this problem. (See also Protocols.)
Penetration Studies
Every serious attempt that we know of to penetrate a particular system has succeeded. Information on penetration studies applied to the systems listed in the tables is sparse. A penetration study of VM/370 (CP/67) done by SDC did conclude that it was significantly more difficult to break into that system, which is based on virtual machines, than into some others.
Protocols
See Network Architectures. The major problem is how to limit the unauthorized information flow possible in the control information, which often has to be transmitted in the clear (unencrypted).
Risk Assessment
A risk assessment attempts to characterize, within a specific installation, the assets of a system, the threats to them, and the system's vulnerabilities to those threats. Risk assessments of computer installations are being conducted at a number of installations. Since risk assessments consider conditions at a specific site, the most general assessment that can be done by the developer is an analysis of the vulnerabilities of the system in general. Vulnerability analyses may be classified, since they may reveal exploitable system flaws. There has been an example risk assessment conducted on GUARD, partly to evaluate risk assessment methodology. Of the completed systems, AFDSC MULTICS and ADEPT-50 are the most likely to have had such tnalyses done. A risk assessment of SHARE-7 has been conducted. Presumably, a vulnerability analysis will be done for AUTODIN II. The most difficult problern in any risk assessment is what value to attach to the data at risk.
Security Models
(,f thý. projects listed in the tables, the MITRE kernel, MULTICS security enhancements and kernel, KSOS, SCOMP, GUARD, MME message systems, AUTODIN II, KVM/370, and SACDIN, all are based on the Bell ana LaPadula model. The UCLA kernel implemented urderlying controls for capabilities, with the specific Bell and LaPadula rules implemented in a "policy manager" module. This uniformity seems to be caused more by government direction than by superiority of the model. In fact, it is now being recognized that models that can more closely reflect applications are necessary, particularly in dealing with data bases. Still, the Bell and LaPadula model (and its restatement in terms of information flow) is the baseline for the field (see i..ef. 2 for a detailed discussion).
Specification Techniques
Parts of several of these systems have been specified formally. Systems and tools employed include SPECIAL/ HDM/Boyer-Moore Theorem Prover (SRI), Gypsy (University of Texas), Ina io/ITP (SDC), and AFFIRM (ISO). There is evidence (e.g., KSOS and SCOMP) that programmers can write formal specifications (after some training) and that some errors (security flaws) are exposed by the use of automated tools to check (verify) the specification. However, the major benefits for security seem to be that other humans (system developers or reviewers) can understand what the specification says and find flaws (security or other) by reviewing the specification manually, despite the often forbidding appearance of a formal specification. This finding is partly a comment on the state of the tools available for formal specification and verification. Evidence from these projects is that the tools currently available, though improving, are best characterized as research vehicles, not productionquality aids to software development.
Verification Techniques
Most of the comments on specification techniques apply here as well. Verificadion of security properties of top-level specifications seems to be within (but fairly near the edge of) the current state of the art. Verification of actual code (in some compilable language) is still very hard for the available tools and usually requires considerable human intervention. Despite apparent progress in research in this area, the present s)stems are some distance from practical use as system development tools. The benefits to be had from attempting verification seem to be software-engineering ones: it forces the designer/ implementor to think hard about what he is doing and leaves an extensive documentation trail for others to review.
Virtual Machines
The KVM/370 is the prime example of a secure system based on this approach; SHARE-7 is another example. This organization helps in isolating individual users at separate security levels, and in systems where isolation is all that is required, it is the best available approach. However, experience indicates that such isolation is rarely what is really needed; if extensive communication between users and across security levels is required, this organization can get in the way.
Virtual Memory
This is one tool for organizing computer systems that it would seem foolish for a developer of a new secure system to forgo. A persistent problem with many of the efforts listed in the tables has been the small virtual address space of 'the PDP-1 1 and its approach toward virtualization of devices.
ADVICE FOR THE DEVELOPER
What are the lessons for the developer of a new system? It is important to distinguish between technologies that are available and useful today and research approaches that appear promising but are unproven. There is, at present, no proven technclogy that can assure that the system being developed will be secure. Those techniques that have been tried have met with varying degrees of success. It is difficult to give objective measures for these degrees of success because there are no good measures that can be applied to rank the security of various systems.
Listed below are the best available approaches for incorporating security into a system under the stated constraints. Each is listed under the appropriate phase of the system development cycle. Many of these simply represent good system design and software engineering practices. 
Requirements
Determining the requirements for security in a system is crucial, because they will affect the entire structure of the system software. Security is not an "add-on" feature. It must be incorporated throughout a 3ystem, and the statement of security requirements for a system shou~d reflect this fact.
There are at present four different modes of operation for which systems processing classified in~formation can be accredited:*
Dedicated:
All system -equipment is exclusively used by that system, and all users are cleared for and have a need to know for all information processed by the system; System high: All equipment is protected in accordance with requirements for the most classified information processed by the system, and all users are cleared to that level, but some users may not have a need to know for some of the information;
Controlled:
Some users have neither a security clearance for nor a need to know for some information processed by the system, but separation of users and classified material is not essentially under operating system control;t and
Multilev~el:
Some users have neither a security clearance for nor a need to know for some information processed by the system, and separation of personnel and material is accomplished by the operating system and associated system software.
Definitions of these modes are provided in DoD Directive 5200.28 131.
A Request for Proposal (RFP) should state what modes of operation are needed for the system initially andý whether future operation in other modes is planned. However, if the requirement for security is isolated and stated baldly ("The system shall be secure"), bidders may view the security requirement separately from other system requirements and so may propose infeasible solutions.
The system architect should consider the system's security requirements as part of its functional requirements from the start. In this way intelligent trade-offs can be made where required and a coherent design, integratin6, the needs for functionality and security, can be obtained. If this procedure is not followed, bidders may claim that they can build the system only to discover that requirements conflict when they are well into the development.
One illuminating example is that of the military database system that normally contains only unclassified data, but during crises some of its contents may be classified. Because the requirement to handle classified data was not implemented initially, its users must either finance a duplicate system, attempt to retrofit security to the existing system, or operate in a manual mode during crises.
One way the system architect can integrate the security requirements with the functional requirements explicitly is to specify the flows of information (especially classified information) that will occur in the system and the flows of authorization. Particular places to look for problems are in the user interface, in any operations that cause information to flow into or out of the system, and any places where the classification of information could be changed.
'Additional constraints may be placed on systems processing compartmented information. t"Essentially' is not further defined in the official documenin. In practice, controlled mode seems to be applied to systems that would be considered as operating in a multilevel mode, but which bar users with clearances below some specified levei from having access to the system. Trade-offs in the provision of security should be identified and assessed as early as possible, For example, physical controls anid computer hardware and software controls are alternative techniques for protecting information stored on computers, If they are not assessed as alternatives early in the system development, however, physical security will be the de fricto choice, because it is much easier to provide after the fact than hardware and software controls. Unfortunately, physical controls frequently restrict functionality more than comparable software controls.
Within the software and hardware design there will be trade-offs as well. Many of these only need to be addressed in the design, but the system requirements should provide guidelines on such matters as the granularity of protection needed, critical pieces of information that may require special protection, acceptab'e bandwidths for leakage channels, and so on. The designers %% 11 be forced to make decisions on these questions whether or not guidelines are provided; it is in everyone's interest that these decisions be informed, not ad hoc.
Design
For development of a multilevel secure system, security must be considered early and often during the design phase. As with rzquiiements, it cannot be added to an existing design. The most prominent design strategy at present is the security kernel approach, but it is not a proven technology. There is evidence that use of a security kernel can impose intolerable functionality or performance burdens. Improved hardware may ease these burdens somewhat, but there are still substantial questions about the viability of this approach. At present, a system designer would be well advised to do the following:
0
Study the functions of the system, focusing on requirements for the flow of classified information -and the interface with the user. Specifically, note under what conditions sensitive information is disclosed or modified, has its classification changed, or enters or leaves the system. Include mechanisms to audit the use of system functions that may leak information.
* Construct a simple model of the flow of information and authority within the system. The model need not be formal, but should be brief, precise, and simple enough to be understood by both the implementors and the users of the system. * Keep the model and the design consistent. If changes are required to either, make correspondinig changes to both. * Develop a hierarchical set of design specifications. Include a top-level specification that reflects the basic functions of the system and the information-flow model, and a program specification that is sufficiently detailed to allow outside reviewers (and new personnel) to review the code structure and to assess the information flows and authorization mechanisms it will have. As the design is created, have it reviewed at regular intervals bo-th by the potential users and by individuals knowledgeable in computer security. KSOS, SCOMP, the SDC Communications Kernel, and other projects have used this approach with good results. Use of formal specifications may be helpful, but their use should be contingent on training of the implementors to the extent that they are competent to read and update them. The software tools presently available for formal specification and verification are still primarily research vehicles, although this situation may change within a few years.
Choose hardware that reduces security problems. Generally, hardware that provides good mechanisms for isolating different computations, simple and efficient ways to control the flow of information between isolated contexts, and a uniform way of treating different kinds of objects is desirable. The following features will help in the implemnentation of secure systems: virtual memory, with controlled access to the mapping registers, a device interface that offers the possi-
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I ON M J ** bility of a uniform treatment of memory, files, and devices;, and the ability to charge addressing contexts rapidly. Several machine states that restrict access to critical portions of the instruction set are not req4uired if all -accesses to data are mediated by the virtual memory mechanism, but they can be used as another way of protecting critical operating system data (e.g., the conterts of the mapping registers).
Implementation
The implementation should employ a language for which there is a well-understood, reliable compiler. There are some languages (e.g., Gypsy, Euclid) that have been designed with the intention that programs written in them be verified and others (Pascal, Ada) for which "verifiable subsets" have been proposed. Experience to date indicates that a reliable compiler and the disciplined use of a conventional language are preferable to a relatively untested comnpiler and a "verifiable' language. Assembly language should beavoided whenever possible.
If it becomes necessary for the code to deviate from the specifications, the specifications should be updated in parallel with the code changes. Go,.d coding practices benefit the security of the system as well as its reliability and maintainability. Careful attention should be paid to configuration control.
Verification and Testing
Automated verification that a given formal top-level specification obeys the Bell and LaPadula security model is within the state of the art, but it is far from routhike. Experience shows also that virtually all applications require functions that violate the Bell and LaPadula model. Thus, if the specification is verified to enforce this model, the implementation will deviate from it in some respect. At present, automated verification of the security properties of substantial amounts of code is beyond the state of the art. These techniques hold promise for the future, but there is substantial risk in employing them in a system development that starts next week. The verification of specific properties of a specification or small pieces of code can be done by hand or, if written in suitable languages, with machine assistance. Currently, the principal benefit of doing so is that the exercise focuses a good deal of attention on the specification or code at hand and requires the doer to think the problem through very carefully. A few, but not many, security flaws in systems have been found through use of verification techniques.
Thorough testing conwinues to be a necessary partner to careful design and implementation of systems to be operated in a multilevel secure mode. When test plans are constructed, specific attention must be given to testing the security provisions of the system. If possible, the developer should arrange for penetration tests and estimate the bandwidths of leakage channels that cannot be eliminated.
Operation
From the standpoint of security, the important aspects of system operation are the controls over changes to the system software and configuration and the conscientious use of the security mechanisms p~rovided by the system. Configuration control is of central importance in the operation of a multilevel secure system, and the design of the system itself should assist in this task. The maintenance of various levels of specification, good coding practices, and use of high-level languages qll help.
One often neglected aspect of operations is the monitoring of the audit trails that are routinely collected: usually they arc too voluminous (and boring) for us to expect a person to do a reasonable job of checking them. Automated tools for this purpose need close attention, since defeating the tools becomes equivalent to defeating the auditing controls. MULTICS: The MULTICS operating system (and the MULTICS hardware) attempted to pay a good deal of attention to protection, if not to security. The most significant innovation in this respect was probably the concept of rings of protection, in which inner (lower numbered) rings are more privileged than outer rings. The architecture generalized the concept of a two-state (supervisor and user) machine to that of an n-state machine, with one state for each ring. For the original MULTICS machine, n -16. In practice, nearly all of the original MULTICS privileged software was in the innermost ring. This result was probably partly due to the fact that handling ring crossings was initially done in software, making it expensive (time consuming). Later, hard.!ware for ring crossing was added and there were efforts to distribute the operating system components across several rings. These efforts were not very successful. MULTICS also included an implementation of access lists for files (segments) and a hierarchical file system. Verification and security models were not considerations in the MULTICS development. Performance of MULTICS was poor for several ycars, but gradually improved to the point that Honeywell now markets MULTICS as a supported product. The current hardware is the Honeywell 6180.
AFDSC MULTICS (MULTICS Security Enhancements):
The Bell and LaPaduia model was applied to MULTICS -MULTICS objects had classifications attached to them and the *-property and simple security condition were enforced. No effort was made to isolate the security-relevant code or to restructure MULTICS into a kernel. The system was installed in 1974 at the Air Force Data Services Center in the Pentagon and has been certified to operate wi'h both TS and S data and with some users cleared only to S.
MULTICS Security Kernel: Following the MULTICS security enhancements, this was an effort to see if the MULTICS operating system could be restructured as a security kernel and supporting software. Studies were done by Honeywell and MITRE separ'-ely. At the same time, MIT studied the MULTICS supervisor tr, see how much of it coi-ld be moved out of Ring 0. The MIT study indicated considerable reduction of Ring 0 cede was possiole without complete restructuring of the system as a kernel. Also, MIT ider,ntified potential performance problems with kernel. This kernel was never built.
MITRE Brassboard Kernel: This was a prototype security kernel developed for a PDP-11. Kernel operations were based on the models constructed by Bell and LaPadula. Performance was poor, but good performance had not been an objective of the project. Both top-level and low-level specifications were written, and extensive manual verification of the kernel operations and the correspondence between specification levels was performed.
MITRE Secure UNIX: When MITRE tried to put a UNIX emulator on top of the brassboard kernel, they found that the match was so poor that a new kernel was ne-ded that provided functionality more suited to UNIX. Formal specifications were written (referred to as "Parnas" specifications), but no verification was done.
UCLA Data Secure UNIX: This was another prototype security kernel for a PDP-1I (parallel to MITRE's), but it was carried much further than the MITRE implementation effort. Its architecture was based on an implementation of "capabilities" for the PDP-11. A prototype was developed and fitted with a UNIX user interface, but performance was very slow. A separate security model was developed for this prototype, based on "data security"; the Bell and LaPadula model could be enforced by a policy manager module running outside the kernel. A strong effort to keep the kern,,i small resulted in a fair amount of code outside the kernel that did have some security-relevant functions (e.g., the policy manager). Hence, comparing code sizes of the UCLA kernel and others must be done carefully. Much effort was expended on formal verification, in cooperation with ISI and the XIVUS theorem prover. The effort seems to have been hampered initially by the lack of a high-level specification of the system. This lack seems to stem from the philosophy that the only verification that counts i; verification of the lowest leel assembly code. Ultimately, the verification of about 35 to 40% of the kernel code was claimed as a feasibility demonstration that the entire kernel could be verified, given sufficient resources.
Message Systems foi Military Message Experiment (MME): Three message systems were developed in competition: Hermes, by BBN; SIGMA, by ISI; and MIT-DMS, by MIT. The ISI system won the competition and was used in the MME. SIGMA was designed as though it were running on a security kernel, although the system underneath it was not in fact a kernel-based system. A "trusted job" was introduced to allow required operations that violated the Bell and LaPadula model. SIGMA required users to confirm activity that could cause insecure information flows. In practice, most users confirmed every operation requested without understanding or thinking about the implications.
SIIARE-7:
This Navy system developed at FCDSSA, and implemented on the AN/UYK-7 computer, is in operational use at several FCDSSA installations. The system was originally designed as a virtual machine architecture, to provide multiple AN/UYK-7's to users. More recently, security-kernel terminology has been used to describe its security structure. It was written in CMS-2. It is now undergoing security certification procedures for operation in the controlled mode. (Originally, certification for multilevel mode had been sought.) It is one of the first systems the Navy has nominated for evaluation by NSA's Computer Security Evaluation Center.
DAMOS: This is an operating system developed by the Danish company Christian R6vsing (CR) to run on its own CR80 computer. The computer and the operating system are described as capability-based, and the operating system includes implementations of a security kernel and trusted processes. These concepts seem to have been developed by CR independent of US efforts in security kernels. DAMOS is a successor to an earlier system, AMOS, and is intended to provide fault tolerant operation in communication-system applications. Systems in which CR80s are or will be used include NICS TARE, a NATO system for automating paper-tape relay operations; FIKS, a Danish DOD system for message, packet, and circuit switching, and CAMPS, a NATO-SHAPE message system for communication centers.
PROJECTS UNDER WAY
KVM/370: This is an SDC project to install a kernel underneath the IBM VM/370 operating system (a virtual machine-based system). Presumably, the system is near delivery. It has been brought up on IBM and Amdahl hardware. Performance is claimed .) be acceptable, though significantly slower (approximately by hall') than standard IVM. This seems to be the only 16 * .
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'P'4 current project dealing with the complexities of a large-scale time-sharing system (though some argue ilita this is really a small system running on large hardware). If successful, it will primarily provide multiple virtual machincs at different security levels, with restricted communication between machines handled via shared "'ninidisks."
KSOS (also known as KSOS-I I): This represents an attempt to build a commercial prototype kernelbased system on a PDP-l 1/70. An emulator on top of the kernel was to provide a UNIX interface to users. Full verification of the security properties of the kernel top-level specification (TLS) (written in SPECIAL) and demonstration or')ofs of correspondence of code (written in MODULA) to specifications were planned. The contract with FACC was terminated in December 1980. Performance with the UNIX emulator and user software layers was poor. Verification of the kernel TLS (using the Boyer-Moore theorem prover at SRI) seems to have been successful. The code proof demonstrations were done by hand. The kernel by itself may prove useful as a base for applications, but the emulator ended up duplicating kernel functions and performed poorly in combination with it. The Navy has funded Logicon to look into building the 'WUARD application directly on the kernel.
SCOMP (Also known as KSOS-6): This project was intended to parallel KSOS-I1 but uses Honeyw,,•ll Level 6 hardware. The U.S. government funded development of a hardware box called the SecL. ty Protection Module (SPM) and the kernel software specification and development. The SPM monitors transfers on the bus without CPU interference, providing faster mediation and enhanced virtual memory/capability structure. The kernel and hardware are nearly complete; kernel performance on the hardware is being tested now. Original plans called for the development (funded by Honeywell) of a UNIX emulator, as in KSOS-11; it now appears that only a minimal operating system interface, containing a simple file system, will be built. Specification of the kernel was done in SPECIAL, with verification using SRI tools. The verification was sulstantially completed, but a few modules proved too large to be passed through the SRI torls. No code proofs are planned. The kernel is coded in UCLA Pascal, compiled via Pascal-to-C (UCLA). The C-to-Level-6 compiler was built by DTI. Trusted processes are to be specified in Gypsy, but the current contract does not cover verification of them.
GUARD (ACCAT, LSi): ACCAi' GUARD (the original version of GUARD) provides a "trusted" path between two database systems or networks that operate at two different security levels. It supports operators who monitor requests made from the low database to the high database and sanitize the responses returned. The trusted process that performs downgrading was specified in Gypsy. GUARD was initially planned to run on top of the KSOS UNIX emulator, but it is now being reevaluated to see if it can run directly on the KSOS kernel. A prototype version was developed to run on an unmodified UNIX. LSI GUARD is an attempt to implement the ACCAT GUARD functions directly on the hardware of a DEC LSI-1 1 (without a kernel) in Euclid. it allows only a single operator, while ACCAT GUARD can have multiple operators.
GUARD (FORSCOM, RAP, KAIS) : Each of these GUARDs is designed to act as a filter between a terminal and a host computer rather than as a query monitor between two databases. FORSCOM GUARD was built by Logicon based on modifications to ACCAT GUARD, and it is being tested by the Army to filter traffic between several WWMCCS terminals and a single WWMCCS host. The system requires a single human operator, who screens traffic for all of the terminals. The FORSCOM GUARD programs (unlike those of ACCAT and LSI GUARD) include substantial information about the semantics of the likely user activities on the WWMCCS host to enable more accurate filtering, FORSCOM GUARD was built on top of standard UNIX because KSOS was not available. Performance of the system was adequate for the Army to use it in a test mode, but it brought some user complaints.
SDC Communications Kernel: This is a project to modify the UCLA prototype PDP-I I kernel for use in communications applications (packet switching, etc,). The code is written in UCLA-Pascal and compiled using the UCLA Pascal-to-C translator. The kernel was heavily modified and tailored to the application; no operating system emulator was used. Performance seems satisfactory at this point, but some performance tests are still pending. Pascal-to-C is not recom--i -nded for further use; it takes about 5 minutes of unloaded PDP-I 1/70 time to compile each of 60 submodules, or 5 hours for the entire system. The requirement for verification of the specification was dropped early in the project; a requirement for "verifiable" code motivated the choice of Pascal-to-C, but the nnly verification actually done has been manual examination of the specification for information channels. kernel is or what the requirements for formal specification and verification were. There have been marty problems in its development, including a mrtahover the definition of "formal specification." Eventually, FACC wrote the code andh an'?o some extent verified (using Ina Jo 'nd ITP), the specification after the fact. The system ha., apparently passed its security and system tests, but the date of its availability to users -s s•ill uncertain. SACDIN: Originally named SATIN IV, this was to be a packet switching net for SAC, but the Air Foce ••s directed to use AUTODIN II for the network backbone. The SATIN IV RFP was thought to be better (with respect to security) than AUTOt)IN i1; the SACDIN development is somewhat less rmbitious than the original plan. IBM is working as a subcontractor to ITT, building a kernelized system. A top-level specification was written and verified, but the implementation is in assembly language (for IBM Series I computers) and no code proofs are planned. No mapping between the spucification and the code has been cnstructed.
COS,'NFE: Thi.s DCA project with DTI is an effort to build a secure network front end for WWMCCS using the DTI-proprietary HUB architecture (HUB a tradernark of DTI). SDC is a subcontractor to DTI for specification and verificatic-,, using ina Jo and ITP. According to DTI, the HUB executive is a security kernel. Top-level and second-level specifications for the HUB have been written, and security criteria for it have been deve!oped and proven to hold for the specifications (bo'' levels). The security criteria are based on maintaining a strict separation of "security level suis." The HUB structure includes many modules that will process data at several securitý levels; these are termed "trusted" modules. Whether formal low-level specifica'ibs xill be written and verified against the code is still ai, open question. The whole s)stem is intended to be small, fast, and application-driven. It is being written in Pascal for PlP-I I architecture. An early sjecification was written in Euclid.
GNOSIS: This is a new operating system built by Tymshare. claimed to be based on an implementation of capabilities for IBM 370 architecture. No formal specification or verification was done, but en important motive in developing the system was to be able to protect timesharing customers' data from theft, so muc& attention was paid to protection (though not to military security). The system is in operational use by its developers, but is not commercially available as yet.
PSOS: An initial specification for a "Provably Secure Operating System" (PSOS) was written by SRI in the mid to late 1970s. This document was used as part of a product description for a .wo-phase contract finally awarded in early 1980 to Ford Aerospace as prime contractor for the so)ftware, with Honeywell as a subcontractor, primarily to provide software, but also to provide some help with verification. The goal is a moderate-to large-scale, general purpose, 'verified (or verifiaole) computer system, not kerneiized. The first phase is for a design only; the second NRI. RUPORT NS54 phase, if awarded, will be for development. The plan is to build a capability-based system, with proofs of the entire OS specification. It is unclear whether code proofs will be done.
Honeywell bid 32-bit minicomputer hardware that looks like a next-generation Level 6, with SPM (see SCOMP). Unsuccessful bidders were Burroughs (software and hardware) and SDC/Univac. The phase-one contract was terminated in May, 1981; the fate of the second phase (for construction) is unknown.
Message Flow Modulatol: A how modulator is a system that receives messages from a source, filters out certain messages, transforms messages that pass the filter, and transmits the resulting messages to a sink. A flow mod, 'itor with a null transform is like a GUARD, and a flow modulator with a nwt! filter and an encrypti,,., ugorithm for a transform is like a standard encryption device. Don Good's group at the University of Texas has developed a simple flow modulator using Gypsy and the Gypsy tools, aild has proven some properties about the system, Present work on the system is aimed at applying, it to a Navy system.
Secure Archival Storage System: The goal of this projec' is to apply security kernel technology to a network of microprocessors that store multilevel files. Ultimately, SASS would provide a shared, secure archival storage for a variety of host computers. The initial implementation is on a single Z8000 processor and is being carried out by Roger Schell, Lyle Cox, and a number of graduate students at the Naval Postgraduate School. Although there are no plans to verify the design or the implementation, and the design seems not to have been specified formally, the authors consider the security kernel to be 'verifiable."
PROJECTS PLANNED
GUARD (RAP, KAIS):
RAP GUARD is to be used by NASA ii a shuttle planning swso.ru between the terminals and other network components. MITRE is workinp on du; design of this system and a similar one for the Korean Air Intelligence System (!KA-I3). In each of these three systems, the GUARD component includes some krt',.;c,4e about the activities the user (at the terminal) is performing on the host, as in F1'$SCOM GUARD. (e.g.: Was the last command an editing command that has a sfe:eriyped response or a database query that could provide significant information to, thc user?) They are intended to operate between a single terminal and a single host, and are not intended to require an operator. They are intended to filter out classified material of inappropriate levels without human intervention.
WWMCCS Local Network: The evolutionary path of WWMCCS and WIN is intended to lead to a set of local networks, interconnected by packet switching (AUTODIN I1) trunks. (All of this is called the WWMCCS Information System IWISI architecture.) SDC presented three scenarios for a trusted/multilevel secure local network to a committee convened by DCA in February 1981. The goal was to identify which scenario would be realistic to specify in an RFP to appear in FY82/83. The most conservative scenario presented, which involved separate local networks at different security levels, connected by a GUARD-like security filter box, was recommended. Additional studies of the architectu;e are to be conducted.
MITRE MLS Terminal:
This project is investigating the practicality of dealing with multilevel objects by assigning a separate microprocessor to handle each security level, with a "trusted feedback monitor to coordinate their activities. A design has been produced based on a word-processing application, and there are plans to implement it.
MMS/TDMS: This is an NRL project (funded by NAVELEX) to design a prototype Military MesrAge System viewed as a Trusted Data Base Management System. A contract was let to SDC to develop design specifications and to work on the proposed MMS security model. BBN has also participated. ISPM]) is to be the hardware base, and the MRS database management system is the most likely to be used.
NON.U.S. WORK
Germany: EIFEL is a German air traffic control network (perhaps also command and control) that is due for a new generation of hardware and software (EIFEL 2). The German equivalent of MITRE was (in 1980) trying to write a specification for the system that included multilevel secure operation. Siemens, Telefunken, arid others were also investigating the problem as prospective bidders, Canada: The Cai;adian Maritime Command is apparently attempting to procure a system that may have a multilevel security requirement.
England: There is some interest in the security problem at the Royal Signals and Radar Establishment (RSRE), Malvern. At last report their central interest was control flow analysis of programs and low-level cod-., -..,cation.
Denmark-
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